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DAV I D L . S N E A D

the fourth chapter, which evaluates the industrialization of naturalresource management during World War II. This chapter is paired with
a compelling epilogue that explores the expansion of U. S. conservation
planning abroad during the postwar era, thereby linking New Deal ideology to the modern global economy.
This ambitious, well-researched study engages many of the questions that have driven recent histories of the 1930s. It convincingly traces
the connections between the idealism of the New Deal and postwar developments that often seem detached from the ideas embraced by President Franklin D. Roosevelt and his cohort of agrarian planners. Although it has much to recommend it, particularly as a study of regional
planning and economic change, it is not, strictly speaking, an interdisciplinary study; methodologically it does little to bridge the gaps between
disciplines. Nevertheless, historians and scholars from other ªelds interested in American conservation will ªnd that this engaging book contributes signiªcantly to a more sophisticated understanding of the New
Deal era.
Sara M. Gregg
Iowa State University

Eisenhower, Science Advice, and the Nuclear Test-Ban Debate, 1945–1963. By
Benjamin P. Greene (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2006) 358 pp.
$65.00
Numerous scholars have examined the Eisenhower presidency within
the past few decades, but few have ventured so deeply into the complex
scientiªc and technical issues surrounding nuclear testing during the
1950s as Greene does in his analysis of Eisenhower’s desire to obtain a
nuclear test-ban treaty while struggling with conºicting scientiªc opinions. Greene lauds Eisenhower for his commitment to a test-ban treaty
and his eventual willingness to overrule opponents within his administration, but he criticizes the former president for failing to provide decisive leadership that might have changed the ultimate outcome. Greene
relies on a wide range of primary sources and a detailed understanding of
the scientiªc and technical issues surrounding nuclear testing to describe
Eisenhower’s difªculty in obtaining clear scientiªc advice to use in policy making.
Greene’s objectives include analyses of Eisenhower’s commitment
to a nuclear test ban, of the scientiªc advice given to him, and of the extent to which divisions within the scientiªc community affected his decision making. He adopts an interesting research design that focuses not
only on positions within the Eisenhower administration concerning radioactive fallout, nuclear testing, and the ability to detect nuclear tests,
but also on the debates within the scientiªc community. This approach
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provides a nuanced view of the complex issues that helped shaped Eisenhower’s decisions about nuclear testing.
Greene’s study reveals how difªcult it was for anyone in the 1950s
to understand the scientiªc and technical questions surrounding nuclear
weapons. He argues that after the BRAVO nuclear test in 1954, the
“sharply contrasting interpretations” of many leading scientists made “an
informed opinion on the matter for laymen even more difªcult” (62).
These “contrasting interpretations” are vital to understanding Eisenhower’s policies. Although Eisenhower eventually secured a better grasp
of nuclear weapons than most non-scientists, he was no less challenged
than the average person in understanding their complexity. By exploring
the scientiªc debates and the scientiªc advice that Eisenhower ultimately received, Greene provides insight into the difªculties that ultimately doomed the test-ban negotiations with the Soviet Union.
Greene reveals Eisenhower’s strong commitment to a nuclear test
ban from at least 1954, but the conºicting and, at times, inadequate
scientiªc advice that he received made it virtually impossible for him to
negotiate a test ban with the Soviet Union while he was in ofªce.
Greene emphasizes the role that Lewis Strauss, chairman of the Atomic
Energy Commission during Eisenhower’s ªrst term, played in controlling the information that Eisenhower received before 1957. Strauss was
vehemently opposed to a nuclear test ban; he prevented almost any
dissenting opinions from ever reaching the president. Only after
Eisenhower had created the Presidential Science Advisory Committee in 1957 did he begin to receive advice supporting his desire for a
test ban. Unfortunately, the lack of any scientiªc consensus prevented
Eisenhower from formulating a coherent, and successful, negotiating
strategy.
David L. Snead
Liberty University

Calculating a Natural World: Scientists, Engineers, and Computers during the
Rise of US Cold War Research. By Atsushi Akera (Cambridge, Mass., The
MIT Press, 2007) 408 pp. $40.00
Akera has written a complicated and nuanced retelling of Cold War
computing history in the United States. He argues that “the intensity of
technological innovation during the Cold War years resulted neither
from military foresight nor from academic inºuence, but rather from a
fundamental pluralism in the demands that were placed upon research”
as it unfolded in a myriad of different “institutional ecologies” across the
nation (1). In this way, Akera agrees with other “constructivist” scholars
of technology that “the study of innovation is as much about institutional innovation as it is about technological innovation” (338). His con-

